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It was concluded that climate change can influence the fragility of a country. The existing 
academic literature has found that it can be as nuanced as the displacement of people due 
to drought, flooding, storms, forest fires, and other natural and human-related forces. 
These scenarios can lead to a large influx of climate refugees into foreign regions that 
under some circumstances may result in localized conflicts due to competition for 
resources and/or cultural and ethnic differences. A rapid and persistent change in 
environmental conditions such as caused by drought has direct consequences for those 
that rely on the natural resources. A sudden and persistent change in the natural 
environment can be analogous to how other species may need to migrate in order to 
survive. Mankind is no exception here, specifically those that are dependent on arable 
land for farming and have no other means of income or food security.  
A mass migration can have potentially destabilizing effects on nearby countries and the 
world due to the interconnectedness of globalization. The case of Syria’s civil war is the 
most prominent case of how climate change contributed to the violent conflict. A 
powerful drought outside of natural variability and linked to anthropogenic climate 
change forced Syrian farmers to abandon their lands and into the outskirts of urban cities 
in pursuit of work. A strain on resources due to unsustainable water policies also resulted 
in a classic case of environmental scarcity which further exacerbated the drought crisis. 
During this time, the Arab Spring protests encouraged revolutionary tendencies in 
neighboring countries and as a result, also spread to Syria. The displaced farmers added 
fuel to the unrest in Syria. The underlying themes associated with conflict and unrest, 
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such as mass migration and resource scarcity, are indirectly applied to conclude that a 
changing climate has the potential to disrupt a stable country and have cascading 
destabilizing effects internally and to neighboring countries. Statistically significant 
findings also suggest that there is a high correlation between temperature anomalies and 
the fragility of a country. However, there is no simple link between climate events and 
instability. Countries with a relatively poor governance structure are most susceptible to 
exogenous natural forces due to their assumed low adaptive capacity to deal with natural 
disasters and/or mitigate their impacts. The correlation of the year to year variations 
between temperature and the number of displaced persons, which is a driver of state 
fragility, are weak. But the upward trends of the number of globally displaced persons 
















Climate change is not solely an ecological issue; it is also a political, moral, and 
economic one. The fact is that our world operates almost entirely on fossil fuels such as 
transportation, power generation, and cooking – all of which require, from a macro 
perspective, some form of carbon-intensive fuel. It is relatively cheap to do so because of 
decades of innovation and infrastructure dedicated to getting more people access to these 
products.  
I was motivated in learning more about climate change after hearing stories about the 
dreadful conditions of a drought in Taishan, China from my mother. In 1986, she 
described instances where her neighbors and friends were fighting over the water well; 
some have even killed others with gardening tools as weapons. The hostility had led to 
violent deaths and overall despair. After understanding that increased drought activity 
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Introduction – Climate Change in Context 
Climate change has been a foreign policy issue since before the Kyoto Protocol, 
but it was only until recently that the international community has acknowledged it as a 
security issue as well (Paskal, 2007). In 2013, Navy Admiral Samuel Locklear, the 
Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, identified climate change as the Pacific 
region’s biggest long-term security threat. Climate change “is probably the most likely 
thing that is going to happen… that will cripple the security environment, probably more 
likely than the other scenarios we all often talk about.” (CNA, 2014) Anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions from the industrial, commercial, transportation, and residential 
sectors will contribute, according to the scientific literature, to future food price spikes, 
displacement of populations, and water scarcity. This may ultimately lead to instability, 
conflict, and violence in fragile regions, which may impact the world as a whole due to 
globalization. Geopolitical stability has always been a primary goal for national and 
international security (CNA, 2014). More than 50% of countries now incorporate specific 
references of climate change in their defense policies (Scott et al., 2016). Scientists from 
around the world are increasingly becoming more and more confident in their ability to 
narrow their projections and reaffirm that anthropogenic climate change will destabilize 
the globe. Such results can take the form of longer fire seasons, acceleration of sea-level 
rise, the collapse of sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, movement of vector-borne diseases 
towards higher latitudes, precipitation becoming more irregular and/or concentrated, and 
increased stress to freshwater systems due to prolonged droughts (CNA, 2017). 
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About half of the world’s population resides in urban environments now. Urban 
living promotes more resource intensive lifestyles that puts upward pressure on power 
consumption and waste production. The world is also becoming more affluent which 
further reinforces the belief that there will be an even greater number of resource-
draining lifestyles. It is believed that projected impacts of climate change will strain 
limited resources and negatively impact governments’ ability to provide basic and 
necessary human support systems, reducing its legitimacy and creating vulnerability to 
social unrest as populations faced with hardship grow susceptible to extremism and other 
radical stimuli (CNA, 2014). Climate change could act as a threat multiplier or, a catalyst 
for conflict around the world (CNA, 2014).  
From the United States’ Department of Defense’s 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review, the effects from climate change are recognized as aggravators of already existing 
stressors such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability and social 
strains, which are situations that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violent 
movements (QDR, 2014). There is a growing understanding that access to essential 
resources and the reliability of critical infrastructure are at risk. Climate change may 
greatly exacerbate existing problems, but in the absence on climate change, these 
problems would still exist (Paskal, 2007). Further, since climate change projections 
contain significant uncertainty due to initial conditions, climate model biases and 
emissions uncertainties, precise projections of future climate-induced social instability 
are not possible (Hawkins et al., 2015). Consequently, some climate security assessments 
have made indeterminate claims that suggested the environmental change was not a 
pressing issue for the military services and reactive policies are the only options available 
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(Briggs, 2010). In addition, misconceptions such as climate change being only limited to 
gradual increases in air temperature, will ultimately hurt countries in which their 
militaries do not understand that even a small change in air or water temperature can have 
a large impact on ecological systems. Indications of climatic and environmental impacts 
will become more obvious in the near future, but what these changes will signify in the 
context of worldwide and local security will require a larger number of effective 
translators to bridge the scientific communities with the national militaries and disaster 




Figures 1 & 2. Both graphs represent the 5 year land-ocean temperature running mean from 1880 to 2016 
in blue and the annual mean in red. X-Axis signifies years and Y-Axis signifies the Temperature Anomaly in 




Methods & Hypothesis 
The linkage between violent conflict and climate change is extremely complicated 
and needs to be better understood in order for policymakers to design comprehensive plans in 
their efforts to adapt to a world where the effects of anthropogenic climate change are 
becoming more prominent. A significant portion of the world mostly functions on a basis in 
which natural resources are exploited such as in agriculture. There is a dependence on the 
natural world and hence a vulnerability to climate variability and change. When an abrupt, 
frequent and/or persistent negative climatic event occurs, this can lead to unwanted 
implications such as social and civil unrest. 
 To answer the question of ‘does climate change contribute to increasing state 
fragility?’ we can review the existing literature and leverage the existing academic capital 
already amassed. This should steer a direction for an independent experiment to be 
conducted, it is also necessary to ease any bias one may have developed. The datasets 
used here have been sourced from independent entities with no agenda other than to 
report and document data. These datasets will be subjected to statistical scrutiny such as 
to account for outliers that may skew the data in an unmeaningful and false direction. The 
objective is to review correlations between key indicators of a nation’s state fragility – 
such as the amount of internally displaced people, government effectiveness, and 
quantified state fragility – with climatic data such as temperature anomalies. The results 
will be used to infer likely explanations for the correlative outcome if such a correlation 
exists. The datasets will be cleaned and treated in Excel 2016 and Tableau 10.1 Public for 
data visualization and analysis. 
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 Some of the data will be treated for outliers by calculating the Median Absolute 
Deviation (MAD) value for all the datasets and omitting all data points outside of the 
median x 2.5 the Median Absolute Deviation (Leys et al. 2013).  
𝑴𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏 𝑨𝒃𝒔𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒕𝒆 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 = 𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏(|𝒙 − 𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒏(𝒙)|) 
The primary analysis tool will be Excel’s ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
regression utilizing F-statistics. Pearson correlations (r) will be calculated to determine 
whether or not an association exists between two variables; the value is between -1 and 1. 
A higher absolute r value signifies a stronger linear correlation. A 0.3 r-value is a weak 
correlation, 0.5 is a moderate correlation, and 0.7 is a strong correlation. Negative r 
values reflect inverse relationships with the same numerical concept. Results will be 
within a 95% confidence interval and classification of independent and dependent 
variables will be made throughout the report. Analyses will be conducted on both the 
correlation strength of the trends as well as the correlation between the year-to-year 
variations. 
The null hypothesis is that a country’s fragility has no association with 
temperature anomalies, the number of internally displaced people, and/or government 
effectiveness. 
𝑯𝟎 = 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒆𝒏𝒐𝒖𝒈𝒉 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔  
The alternative hypothesis is that a country’s fragility can be a function of temperature 
anomalies, the number of internally displaced people, and/or government effectiveness. 
𝑯𝑨 = 𝒔𝒖𝒇𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒅𝒆𝒏𝒄𝒆 𝒕𝒐 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒗𝒆 𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏 𝒃𝒆𝒕𝒘𝒆𝒆𝒏 𝒕𝒉𝒆 𝒅𝒂𝒕𝒂𝒔𝒆𝒕𝒔 
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To determine whether two variables are statistically significant, a p-value below 
an alpha (α) of 0.05 is required. 
𝒑 < 𝜶 = 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 
𝒑 > 𝜶 = 𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒔𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒔𝒕𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒍𝒍𝒚 𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒕 
If the p-value is lower than the alpha of 0.05, the null hypothesis will be rejected 
since there is sufficient evidence to conclude that there is a significant linear relationship 
between the two variables. 
If the p-value is higher than the alpha of 0.05, the null hypothesis will not be 
rejected and there is insufficient evidence to conclude a statistically significant linear 
relationship between the two variables. 
I hypothesize that climate conditions such as increased land and sea temperatures will 
negatively affect the world’s nations and lower stability worldwide. Countries with high 
fragility will be particularly sensitive to climate variations, including rising temperatures 
caused by increased greenhouse gases. I further hypothesize that the amount of internally 
displaced people within a country is directly associated with how fragile a nation is and also 
dependent on the temperature anomalies. Precipitation is likely to be at least as important as 
temperature in the context of state fragility, the scope of this report does not capture the role 
of precipitation because no plug and play dataset was readily available. Granular and gridded 
precipitation data exists but would take extensive data cleaning to be aggregated up into the 




The projected effects of climate change have the potential to alter water 
variability and river flow. Rivers such as the Jordan and Tigris-Euphrates in the Middle 
East are expected to experience reductions in stream flow. But other basins such as the 
Congo in equatorial Africa and the La Plata in South America, will experience increases 
in flow, adding to inundation issues. Climate change and its role in water variability is 
expected to increase security concerns between countries or within regional river basins. 
Predictions of ‘water wars’ have been made in reference to nations heavily dependent on 
natural water resources. Shared water management strategies may, however, evolve 
because of the desire to avoid possible political tensions and violent conflicts associated 
with the sharing reducing freshwater resources. Research suggests that higher water 
variability over time may drive nations to cooperate further; at least until variability 
increases beyond a certain threshold, then cooperative behavior is negatively affected 
(Dinar, 2017).  
Regions comprised of developing countries that have a substantial reliance on 
climate-sensitive resources may lack the ability to deal with and adapt to climate change 
impacts effectively. There are over 800 million global citizens that have no access to safe 
and clean water; this is projected to reach an overwhelming 2 billion people by 2050. Just 
2% of the Earth’s water is freshwater but almost half of this 2% is not usable for human 
consumption due to pollution and evaporation. A growing human population will be 
competing for limited water resources, a problem compounded by climate change with its 
adverse impact on water sources and enhanced levels of flooding and drought. From a 
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2008 Technical Report of IPCC, it is claimed that increased precipitation intensity and 
variability will increase the hazards of flooding and drought in many areas, affecting food 
stability, water quality and intensifying many forms of water pollution. Another layer to 
be considered is the pollution levels in many of the world’s regions, which have reached 
widespread and hazardous levels that compromise water security. Lastly, the impacts 
from flooding, drought, saltwater intrusion, erratic weather patterns, and elevated water-
borne diseases will challenge existing water security and supply for millions. China and 
India, the two most populated countries in the world, will face significant water scarcity 
challenges that may result in internal conflict (Pink, 2016). 
Given the security implications of climate change impacts on water, international 
water treaties may prove essential to ensure hydro-political related stability. Even in 
regions without formal agreements, transboundary waters will nevertheless still require 
effective management and water agreement commitments (Dinar, 2017). But even water 
treaties can be broken when pressures grow too great. The Indus Waters Treaty between 
India and Pakistan, which was in effect for more than 60 years, and is an area of 
cooperation between the two adversaries, had been threatened to be revoked by India 
after Pakistan-based terror attacks in 2016. It was still however, unlikely to have been 
rescinded due to the foreseeable international condemnation that would have resulted; but 
the fact remains that upstream nations have and potentially will employ tangible leverage 
over downstream nations. This can have cascading effects, such as inspiring China to do 
the same and reduce flows of the Brahmaputra River to downstream India (CNA 2017). 
This will ultimately bring about complex discussions for human and international 
security as the United Nations Commission on Human Security defines human security 
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as: “To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms 
and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedom — 
freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and 
pervasive (widespread) threats and situations.” Furthermore, the U.N. General Assembly 
approved a landmark human rights statement sustaining that water constitutes a “human 
right” in 2010 (Pink, 2016). Thus, another layer of complexity will need to be injected 
into the already difficult topic of ensuring international security among countries and will 
require additional solutions. 
Decreased water availability can be a chief cause of civil unrest and localized 
violence. Especially when combined and compounded by other existing negative facets 
such as poor water management, corrupted governments, or pre-existing social tensions. 
Water issues can also bring nations to the negotiating table to participate in diplomatic 
discussions. But in the same respect, water stress can also be exploited by non-state 
actors such as violent extremist organizations that can weaponize water. Because of its 
essential value, threats to, or taking control of, water infrastructure and supply can be 
used by organizations to advance their interests. For example, this sort of activity may 
force those that do not want to take part in any violence, into situations where they must 
support groups in order to receive water and food (CNA, 2017). Water stress and its 
influence in conflict is also relevant to state-on-state conflicts. As nations experience 
greater water stress due to population pressures, migration, and climate change – water 
insecurity can magnify existing tensions between nations. Although it is not likely that 
water will start a major war, it still can exist as a contributing factor (CNA, 2017). 
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Food Security 
Water scarcity can also lead to sharp increases in food costs, which has direct 
correlation with stability. Rising food prices can cause riots and social unrest as 
illustrated in Figure 3 (Bellemare, 2014). China for example, will experience significant 
climate change impacts from drought, floods, aridification, saltwater intrusion that could 
lead to, rising food and grain prices, public health crises, vulnerability to malaria due to 
warming temperatures, and environmental refugees, all of which will have extensive 
bearing on food security. Government functionality and the ability to contain epidemics 
of all kinds can have a substantial effect on preventing associated risks to government 
legitimacy. Government intervention and capacity building may also have unintended 
consequences when they are not entirely scoped out and can potentially worsen an 
already fragile scenario. Even with economic meltdowns aside, climate change will exert 
pressure on water security, food security, and the overall world economy. Non-climatic 
circumstances such as overpopulation can also induce food insecurity but climate change 
likely aggravates impacts. This coupling of impacts will require special governance and 
international cooperation to reduce the risk of food insecurity as well as strengthen ties 
between countries to stimulate more inclusive trade (Ane Cristina Figueiredo Pereira De 
Faria et al., 2016). However, trade also has the potential to work both ways – if there is a 
decline in global production, the wealthiest market participants may have the incentive to 
buy up scarce resources making this food scarcity more intense and further reducing 
availability to others, specifically the poor. In circumstances where countries are 
becoming more globally interconnected and dependent on imports for their food supply, 
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the global food system would exhibit similar characteristics to that of a fragile nation who 
is vulnerable to self-propagating disturbances. Super-efficient and globally connected 
markets allow for the possibility to make this theoretical inequality even greater. And 
extreme weather anomalies could trigger this global systemic disruption (Puma et al., 
2015). 
Droughts have exposed several issues that hamper effective responses to the core 
problem, such as a lack of irrigation systems, insufficient water reserves, inadequate 
drought emergency management, and generally weak capacity to adapt to persistent and 
severe droughts. This is particularly concerning in China, as noted by the author Yunnan 
Chen, “China’s central and local governments have good reason to be concerned. The 
effects of water shortage and pollution are not merely ecological, but also have 
implications for social stability. In 2005, there were around 50,000 environment-related 
protests. Though official statistics are difficult to find, the number of such protests has 




Figure 3. (Bellemare 2014) 
 
Mass Migration 
Environmental scarcities have been contributing to violent conflicts in many parts 
of the developing world and may be indicative of more to come in the future as resources 
become even scarcer. These environmental scarcities can swell social impacts, such as 
population movement, economic deterioration, and the weakening of states. These can 
contribute to persistent sub-national violence, with the rate and extent of such social 
conflicts increasing as scarcities worsen (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Historians have also 
claimed that the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) may have driven global patterns of 
social conflict in the past, which emerging research confirms (Hsiang et al., 2011). ENSO 
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influences a variety of climatological variables, each of which may plausibly influence 
how conflict-prone a society may be (Hsiang et al., 2011). The violence as a result may 
be both localized, persistent, and drawn-out. Those in poor communities will be primarily 
affected considering that their communities are often underserved, have little to no buffer 
enabling surviving through poor years and are often highly dependent on foreign and 
domestic government assistance. These poor societies are already suffering from grave 
hardships due to shortages of water and fertile land.  
Migration is an environmental adaptation and response to the local environmental 
conditions such as the availability of food and seasons. Mass migration can produce 
prospects for constructive change in the distribution of wealth and land as well as a 
beneficial change in governance. But unpredictable surges can overwhelm efforts at 
useful social reform; once a tipping point is reached, societies may contain either 
fragment or become more authoritarian when state institutions cannot meet the demands 
of its citizens (Homer-Dixon, 1994). Fragmented countries will be a source of excessive 
out-migrations and may be unable to effectively negotiate international agreements on 
security or trade due to its poor validity as a viable and functioning country. There may 
not be assurance that these fragmented countries will continue to exist in the near future 
and thus communications with other countries may be limited. If they are converted to be 
authoritarian regimes, they may be inclined to attack neighboring countries to divert 
media attention away from internal pressures as well. All of which has the potential to 
disturb international security (Homer-Dixon, 1994).  
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Figure 4. (Homer-Dixon 1994) 
Findings from a growing volume of rigorous quantitative research across multiple 
disciplines suggest that past climatic events have exerted considerable influence on 
human conflict. This influence appears to extend across the world, throughout recorded 
history, and at all gauges of social institutions. Although climatic events are not 
conclusive as the sole or primary driving force in conflict, it was concluded by Hsiang et 
al. that when large climate variations do occur, they can have significant effects on the 
occurrence of conflict across a diversity of settings (Hsiang et al., 2011).  
 In comparing the datasets of Global Land and Ocean Temperature Anomalies 
(dataset from NOAA National Centers for Environmental Information) against the 
Number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) (dataset from the Center for Systemic 
Peace via the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center), there is a moderate association, 
with a Pearson Correlation (r) of 0.71. The temperature anomaly (°C) represents a 
departure from the long-term average for year 1910 to 2000 (NOAA). The results are also 
statistically significant with a p-value of 1.49E-07. The number of internally displaced 
persons represents the aggregation of all displaced people in the world for every year 
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from 1964 to 2008 and was normalized for growth in population by dividing the global 
IDP by the world population for his respective year (population data sourced from The 
World Bank) to account for the strong population growth seen throughout the world. The 
correlation suggests that as temperatures rise it may increase the number of IDP. This 
finding does not include shock or extreme climatic events such as prolonged droughts, 
aridification, intense rainfall, flooding, forest fires, and unpredictable hurricane tracks 
that are all made more likely due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. One 
particular interesting thing to note here is the increase in the number of displaced people 
in the late 1980s to 1990s and then a decrease since, even as temperature continued to 
rise. Upon applying a heat map to the raw data-sets to isolate the countries that are 
causing this uptick, Liberia dominated the amount of IDPs. The 1989-1996 Liberian Civil 
War was long in its gestation, it was rooted in the very foundation of the state (Sirleaf, 
1991). It is unclear whether or not the climate had direct influence over the first Liberian 
civil war. The year-to-year variations between temperature and the number of IDP have a 





Figure 5. Global Land and Ocean Temperature Anomalies vs # of Internally Displaced Persons 
(normalized for population growth); Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. Pearson 
Correlation (r = 0.71) (p-value = 1.49E-07). The independent variable is Anomaly (°C); the dependent 
variable is the Population Normalized IDP 
 
 
Figure 6. Year-to-year change (from 1965 to 2008) in Global Land and Ocean Temperature Anomalies vs 
# of Internally Displaced Persons (normalized for population growth); Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were 
omitted due to lack of data. Pearson Correlation (r = 0.06) (p-value = 0.72337). The independent variable is 
Anomaly (°C); the dependent variable is the year-to-year change in Population Normalized IDP 
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Figures 7-10. Region Temperature Anomalies vs Regional Population Normalized IDPs; Years 1973, 
1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. Omitted South Africa regional data due to vast 
displacement from systematic Apartheid. Left Y-Axes represent Temperature Anomalies (°C), Right Y-
Axes represent Population Normalized IDP. Pearson Correlations: Western Asia (r = 0.76; p-value = 
4.39E-09), Europe (r = 0.53; p-value = 0.0003), Central & South America (r = 0.63; p-value = 7.26E-06), 
Africa (r = 0.73; p-value = 3.04E-08). The independent variables are Anomaly (°C); the dependent 
variables are the regional Population Normalized IDPs 
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Figures 11-14. Year-to-year changes in regional Temperature Anomalies vs Regional Population 
Normalized IDPs (from 1965 to 2008); Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. 
Omitted South Africa regional data due to vast displacement from systematic Apartheid. Left Y-Axes 
represent Temperature Anomalies (°C), Right Y-Axes represent Population Normalized IDP. Pearson 
Correlations: Western Asia (r = 0.24; p-value = 0.1273), Europe (r = 0.10; p-value = 0.2408), Central & 
South America (r = 0.22; p-value = 0.1703), Africa (r = 0.20; p-value = 0.2027).  
 
All correlations in Figures 7-10 show statistically significant findings with moderate to 
strong correlations. This supports the hypothesis that Temperature Anomalies have a 
significant and casual influence over the amount of internally displaced persons, 
especially in developing regions. Western Asia, Central & South America, and Africa 
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mostly developing countries, which suggests that they are particularly vulnerable to 
climate change. 
However, all correlations in Figures 11-14 do not have statistical significance and exhibit 
weak correlations. This supports the null hypothesis that year-to-year changes in 
Temperature Anomalies do not have a significant and casual influence over the year-to-
year changes in the amount of internally displaced persons. One possible explanation for 
this is that the year to year changes are absorbed by countries since there have not been 
great swings in variation between years. Overall, the upward trends of both IDP and 
temperature appear strongly correlated but cannot be concluded as related; there may be 
other causes for the upward trends of IDP. 
 
Fragile States Index & State Fragility Index 
To the extent possible, a nation’s stability can be quantified numerically and be 
used as a basis to evaluate nation solidity. The Fragile States Indexes of all countries 
were aggregated for each respective year to be representative of the entire world. The 
Fragile States Index measures conflict risks and holistically computes ratings based on its 
patented Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST). A greater numerical value signifies a 
stronger and more stable nation.  
In comparing the datasets of Global Land and Ocean Temperature Anomalies 
against the Fragile States Index 2017; there appears to be a moderately negative 
 21 
correlation, with a Pearson Correlation (r) of -0.40 and p-value of 0.219. Considering that 
the p-value is above the alpha of 0.05, the correlation is not statistically significant, and 
the null hypothesis is kept. The data spanned from 2006 to 2017 with the year 2006 being 
omitted due to it being a significant outlier with a value outside of the median x 2.5 the 
median absolute deviation (MAD). 
 
Figure 15. Global Land and Ocean Temperature Anomalies vs Global Fragile States Index. (r = -0.4; p-
value = 0.219). The independent variable is Anomaly (°C); the dependent variable is Fragile States Index 
Similar to the Fragile States Index, in comparing the datasets of Global Land and 
Ocean Temperature Anomalies against the State Fragility Index (dataset from the Center 
for Systemic Peace), there also appears to be a reverse correlation. But with a Pearson 
Correlation (r) of -0.76, this indicates an even stronger inverse linear relationship and a p-
value of 3.97E-05. The p-value is expressively lower than the alpha of 0.05, and thus the 
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Figure 16. Global Land and Ocean Temperature Anomalies vs Global State Fragility Index. (r = -0.76; p-
value = 3.97E-05). The independent variable is Anomaly (°C); the dependent variable is State Fragility 
Index 
We see a general trend downwards over time for both the Fragile States Index and 
the State Fragility Index but will only consider the State Fragility Index. This downward 
trend is somewhat indicative of growing stability in the world overall. It should not be 
misconstrued to mean that as global temperatures rise and as unpredictable climatic 
events become more frequent, that nations are becoming more secure and stable. In 
consideration of the existing scientific literature on how climate change is associated with 
social unrest, this finding suggests that there exist strong mitigating mechanisms that the 
global community has adopted to help keep the peace, such as increased effectiveness of 
governance, quality of public services, civil service, independence from political 
pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
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Figure 17. Map above shows the Fragile States for 2016, raw data was processed in Tableau for 




Figure 18. Map above shows the State Fragility Index for 2016, raw data was processed in Tableau for 
visualization. Analysis conducted on available years.  
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Figure 19. Global State Fragility vs Global IDP (r = 0.58) p-value = 0.029. The independent variable is 
Population Normalized Internally Displaced Persons, the dependent variable is the State Fragility Index 
In analyzing the global State Fragility Index with the global amount of Internally 
Displaced Persons, a positive and moderate correlation was found (r = 0.58) with a p-
value of 0.029. This statistically significant p-value allows for the acceptance of the 
alternate hypothesis, which states that there is a meaningful correlation between state 
fragility and the number of internally displaced people. The claim that the lowering of the 
amount of internally displaced people is consistent with the theory that state fragility is a 
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Government Effectiveness 
In comparing the datasets of the State Fragility Index against Government 
Effectiveness (dataset from The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators), there 
appears to be a strong reverse correlation, with a Pearson Correlation (r) of -0.88 and a p-
value of 1.84E-06 which signals statistical significance and a rejection of the null 
hypothesis. This is supportive of the theory that as more effective global governance is 
deployed, the world drops its overall State Fragility Index over time and instability 
worldwide decreases. This is intuitively reasonable to predict and is consistent with the 
existing literature; as more people gain access to resources and services, the tendencies to 
revolt would decrease now that citizens will have more to lose if a collapse in society 
takes place. Government, public services, and rule of law coupled with proper 
implementation of policies to benefit citizens will serve to be a contributing factor for 
mitigating outside natural forces that seem to influence stability, such as temperature 
anomalies. 
 
Figure 20. Global State Fragility and Government Effectiveness have a strong inverse relationship. Pearson 
Correlation (r = -0.88) As government services increase, fragility in the global community responds in the 
reverse direction. (p-value = 1.84E-06). The independent variable is State Fragility Index, the dependent 
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 The adaptive capacity of countries to deal with climate change is dependent on 
the ability of governments to develop and implement adaptation strategies. It is not 
difficult to conceptualize that countries with both a high sensitivity to climate change and 
a low adaptive capacity will yield a worse overall outcome when dealing with natural 
disasters such as storms and droughts. Countries with a highly effective government 
would likely have high resiliency to the natural disasters that may one day strike their 
borders. A key attribute of adaptive capacity is the ability for governments and civil 
society to design and implement action. It stands to reason that countries in a state of 
fragility will fare worse off than countries with little fragility. This can be further 
rationalized by conceptualizing that nations at or near the brink of social collapse do not 
have environmental hazards or preparations for disasters very high on their national 
agendas. Their government efforts will likely be applied to economic strategies and/or 
other urgent matters that are more short-term centric such as consolidating power under a 
totalitarian regime. Therefore, countries with weak public and civil services will be more 
vulnerable to climate change and particularly susceptible to its effects.  
 In analyzing all the countries in the lower 50% of Government Effectiveness 
Index, there is now a stronger correlation between the Global Temperature Anomalies 
and the number of people that are internally displaced within the country. Further 
expanding this methodology to analyze even worse off countries in the Government 
Effectiveness Index, such as countries in the lower 25% and lower 12.5% - it was found 
that the correlation between temperature anomalies and the number of internally 
displaced people becomes stronger and stronger for nations with lower government 
services. Although the correlation strength change between the lower 50%, 25% and 
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12.5% is minimal, the results are consistently found to be statistically significant and 
have strong correlation. Therefore, the null hypothesis may be rejected as we have 
sufficient evidence to claim that climatic temperature anomalies may influence the 
amount of people that are internally displaced in nations that have weak government 
services and structures. 
Earlier, it was determined that there was a strong correlation between the global 
temperature anomalies and the number of globally internally displaced persons in Figure 
5; the strong-moderate correlations characterized in Figures 21, 23, and 25 supports the 
theory that countries who lack effective governments are more vulnerable to climate 
change impacts. Figures 22, 24, and 26 represent the year to year changes in temperature 
and IDP and were found to be poorly correlated and not statistically significant. 
 
Figure 21. Countries in the lower 50% of the Government Effectiveness Index have a strong correlation 
with Global Temperature Anomalies. Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. 
Pearson Correlation (r = 0.66) (p-value = 1.85E-06) The independent variable is Anomaly (°C); the 



















































Global Temperature Anomalies vs Lower 50% of Government 
Effectiveness Index Countries
Lower 50% of Government Effectiveness IDP Population Normalized Anomaly (°C)
 28 
 
Figure 22. Year-to-year change in temperature and IDP for countries in the lower 50% of the Government 
Effectiveness Index. Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. Pearson Correlation (r = 
0.008) (p-value = 0.9613). 
 
Figure 23. Countries in the lower 25% of the Government Effectiveness Index have a strong correlation 
with Global Temperature Anomalies. Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. 
Pearson Correlation (r = 0.68) (p-value = 8.79E-07) The independent variable is Anomaly (°C); the 
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Figure 24. Year-to-year change in temperature and IDP for countries in the lower 25% of the Government 
Effectiveness Index. Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. Pearson Correlation (r = 
0.03) (p-value = 0.8465)  
 
Figure 25. Countries in the lower 12.5% of the Government Effectiveness Index have a strong correlation 
with Global Temperature Anomalies. Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. 
Pearson Correlation (r = 0.69) (p-value = 4.1E-07) The independent variable is Anomaly (°C); the 
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Figure 26. Year-to-year change in temperature and IDP for countries in the lower 12.5% of the 
Government Effectiveness Index. Years 1973, 1975, and 1979 were omitted due to lack of data. Pearson 
Correlation (r = 0.024) (p-value = 0.8824)  
 
Figure 27. Countries in shades red were analyzed to determine correlative significance to Global 
Temperature Anomalies. Picture above shows the Government Effectiveness Index for 2016, analysis was 
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The Case of Syria 
On December 17, 2010, a Tunisian fruit seller had sent himself on fire and 
sparked what is commonly referred to as the “Arab Spring.” He had self-immolated 
himself after the police had spilled his fruit onto the ground. This can be seen as a 
representative outward expression of his fellow citizens, and thus resulted in widespread 
protests and eventual revolution across the region through a domino effect. The events 
from Tunisia had spread to Egypt and Libya and ultimately to most of the Middle East 
which may have ultimately led to a civil war in Syria. As a result of the Syrian civil war, 
thousands of people died and more than a million people have been displaced 
(Harunoğulları, 2017). It is claimed by scientists that climate change is playing a 
contributing role in the drying of the eastern Mediterranean – “The magnitude and 
frequency of the drying that has occurred is too great to be explained by natural 
variability alone.” (Human via NOAA, 2011) A severe drought struck Syria and the 
wider Levant in the years preceding the onset of strife and this too has been partly 
attributed to this eastern Mediterranean drying (Kelley et al., 2015). The drought that 
overwhelmed Syria was a noteworthy driver of its civil war with the consequential food 
insecurity and mass migration as key factors that marginalized civilian populations and 
fashioned rampant discontent, generating the conditions for violence that ultimately 
became reality (King, 2015). It is also worth mentioning that the borders drawn up in the 
Middle East by the French and British at the end of World War I are largely artificial. 
There have been decades of prevailing conflicts within the Middle East region related to 
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ethnic and religious differences. This can lead to confusing and unclear alliances when 
and if foreign intervention transpires.  
Syria and the greater Fertile Crescent had experienced their worst 3-year drought 
on record prior to the social unrest. Syria was made particularly vulnerable to 
revolutionary tendencies after frustrations with the national government and negative 
social impacts caused by drought conditions. This drought had intensified their existing 
water and agricultural insecurity which produced cascading agricultural failures and 
killed off much of the country’s livestock. The Bashar al-Assad regime also played a 
direct contributing role in conflict after government agricultural policies in 1971 sought 
to increase agricultural production to have Syria become food self-sufficient. Without 
adequate farmable land and exploiting the already insufficient water resources, the 
regime held no regard to sustainable practices in their policy efforts. As a result, the 
groundwater declined and was infrequently replenished by the winter rainfall. Farmers 
strongly depended on this rainfall as two-thirds of the cultivated land in Syria is rain fed 
(Kelley et al., 2015). One of the most direct links to the instability from the aridification 
was the out-migration of up to 1.5 million people from the rural farming areas to the 
outskirts of urban cities in both Syrian cities and neighboring nations (Kelley et al., 
2015). The adaptive response of Syrian farmers to droughts in the past were generally to 
find other means of income such as allowing livestock owners to feed off the failed crops 
to receive compensation. These alternatives were short-term solutions and may have 
performed reasonably for 1 or 2 years, however, after approaching the 3-year mark, it 
likely forced farmers to migrate away from their lands in pursuit of income after all 
resources were exhausted. One Syrian remarked – “When the drought happened, we 
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could handle it for two years, and then we said, ‘it’s enough.’ So, we decided to move to 
the city.” (Friedman, 2013) 
       
Figure 28. Average rainfall (1900-2000 in blue) and average rainfall from drought before the Syrian civil 
war (dataset from World Bank’s Climate Change Knowledge Portal). 
The drought was also particularly tough on young men who had wanted to study 
or marry but were unable to do either due to not being able to afford it. Families married 
off daughters at earlier ages because they could no longer support them (Friedman, 
2013). This bulging of unemployed youths draws on a conflict theme in which a 
particularly large percentage of unemployed youths between the ages of 15 to 25 of an 
overall adult population, and where political institutions are weak, are strongly associated 
with increased risks for political and localized violence (Goldstone, 2002). Figure 29 
reflects the unemployment status of Syria for those in the age range of 15-24, which is 
consistent with the aforementioned risk connection. The rapidly growing urban 
peripheries of Syria were overcrowded, riddled with crime and unemployment, and were 
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2015). Although it is not true to say that overall population growth or density will 
generally lead to violent conflicts, research has shown that abrupt changes to the status 
quo such as mass migrations, in which rapid and unforeseen population changes occur in 
a relatively short time span are strongly associated with political instability (Goldstone, 
2002). 
 
Figure 29. Unemployment rate between 1991 and 2011 (% of youths between 15 and 24) for 
Syria (dataset from International Labor Organization, ILOSTAT database) 
Water scarcity played a telling yet complex role in creating the conditions that led 
to the unrest. The drought’s effect on ecological systems and human systems such as food 
security give rise to human responses that took the form of violent conflicts and mass 
migrations to shanty towns in urban cities. It is clear that these aspects contributed to the 
rise of militant extremism, where it created a framework that allowed the Islamic State to 
recruit 60-70% of its forces locally. This is partly because the Islamic State controlled the 
routing of electricity and transportation in Syria’s city, Aleppo (King, 2015). The 
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total annual water withdrawal as a proportion of internal renewable water resources was 
as much as 160% in 2011. Global climate models also overwhelmingly agree that the 
region will become even drier in the future as greenhouse gas concentrations increase 
(Kelley et al., 2015).  
Taking a targeted look at the Fragile States Index, we see Syria gradually 
increasing its fragility score after 2011 and nearing similar scores given to the most 
unstable nations in the world. The rate at which it happened also paints an illustrative 
picture that this rapid rise of instability is unlike anything the world has ever seen in 
recent years.  
 
Figure 30. Fragile States Index highlighting Syria (2006 to 2017) built in Tableau 
In analyzing the Government Effectiveness data and State Fragility data, we see 
moderate to strong response especially after the 2006 - 2010 drought. With a Pearson 
Correlation (r) of -0.61 and a p-value of less than 0.05 which permits the rejection of the 
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null hypothesis, and suggests that as Syria’s Government Effectiveness dwindled, its 
State Fragility had largely responded in the opposite direction and was ultimately unable 
to quell its internal conflicts. The country’s adaptive capacity was below what was 
necessary to ensure continued stability. 
 
Figure 31. Syrian Government Effectiveness vs Syrian State Fragility Index reveals that as 
Government Effectiveness plummets, fragility increases. Pearson Correlation (r = -0.61); p-value = 0.0067. 
The independent variable is Government Effectiveness of Syria, the dependent variable is State Fragility 
Index of Syria 
The orange highlighted sections of figures 32-35 below depict the 2006 – 2010 
drought; trends for the State Fragility Index, Government Effectiveness, Fragile States 
Index, and Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (dataset sourced from 
The World Bank) for Syria have all significantly reacted immediately following the 
drought. This suggests that a tipping point existed in the conflict. The displaced farmers 
in the outer borders of the urban cities, where the protests have also occurred, likely 
stayed in these cities to participate in these protests due to not having employment or the 
ability to go back to their farms. Their involvement possibly and reasonably contributed 
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Figures 32-35. Syrian response immediately following the 2006 – 2010 drought highlighted in orange. 
Rapid rise in the State Fragility and Fragile States indices, rapid fall in the absence of violence/terrorism 









































































































Through the experiments conducted on state fragility, temperature anomalies, 
government effectiveness, and the number of internally displaced people – it appears 
likely that climate conditions and the fragility of a nation are interrelated but are 
obviously not causal in both respects. The fragility of a country is likely a dependent 
variable of the temperature anomalies. We see statistically significant findings for 
relationships between temperature anomalies and the number of internally displaced 
people and state fragility. One powerful indicator for the level of fragility a nation has is 
its government effectiveness as previously concluded. Countries with a high government 
effectiveness rating are likely to have more control and resources available to absorb 
the shock of climate disasters and the gradual increase of temperatures. However, all 
year to year variations between temperature and IDP were poorly coorelated and were 
not found to be statistically significant. The assumed explanation is that the year to year 
changes are able to be absorbed by countries in the short term since there have not 
been observations of significant swings in variation between years but only an upward 
trend. Overall, the upward trends of both IDP and temperature appear strongly 
correlated but cannot be conclusively settled as interrelated; there may be other causes 
for the upward trends of IDP that should be explored. It is certaintly possible that 
temperature plays a contributing role in state fragility, but there may be other more 
appropriate factors such as precipication. 
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Countries with a high government effectiveness are presumed to also have high 
adaptive capacities and resiliency to be able to deal with exogenous influences from 
climatic events such as droughts, floods, and storms. Additional statistically significant 
findings include confirmation that countries with low government effectiveness ratings 
are more susceptible to temperature anomalies. The weaker a government is to 
implement public and civil services, the more vulnerable the country becomes to 
climate change. The trend for temperature anomalies is positive and will likely continue 
to climb even with the implementation of climate mitigation strategies such as the Paris 
Agreement. This allows the interpretation that developing countries with low resiliency 
and government effectiveness will likely yield greater numbers of internally displaced 
persons in the future assuming the positive trend of temperature anomalies holds. This 
will likely increase its national fragility and move countries closer to social collapse or 
the establishment of totalitarian states to attempt to stablize the countries. Countries 
that experience both negative and abrupt climatic events in combination with other 
disaster scenarios such as war and disease will be affected the most significantly. 
Natural forces can contribute to a failing state's demise but cannot be definitively 
proven to be the sole cause for social unrest. There likely exists other macro effects that 
cause the fragmentation of countries, but the climate does play a contributing role. 
Other factors such as economic and ethnic differences may hold more weight in their 
ability to disturb stability but environmental conditions may still play a significant 
contributing role. As temperatures and the likelihood of climate disasters occurring in 
nearly all regions of the world increases, the potential that climate change has on 
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disrupting food and water supplies and the rate of human migration may permit the 
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